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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a medical malpractice case wherein plaintiffs allege the care and treatment
provided by Dr. Hanson to plaintiff David Samples, related to a gallbladder removal surgery,
was negligent. Plaintiffs' specific allegations have changed over time in response to motion
practice.

However, plaintiffs have never presented any admissible expert witness testimony

regarding any of their allegations. As a result, the trial court dismissed this matter.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs have set forth only a limited procedural history in Appellants' Brief. Plaintiffs'
history does not provide sufficient detail to permit an understanding of the relevant proceedings
and motions leading up to the district court's decision to dismiss this matter. Plaintiffs did not
appeal some of the additional motions, but defendants have included a history of the same
because they provide context for the ultimate dismissal of this matter. The relevant proceedings
are discussed below in more detail.
Additionally, plaintiffs have made numerous erroneous statements throughout their
procedural history, which defendants have corrected herein. Therefore, to correct and clarify the
relevant course of proceedings below, defendants submit the following procedural history:
1. Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Late Disclosed Experts

On January 30, 2013, the trial court entered its Order Setting Pre-Trial and Jury Trial
("Scheduling Order").

R. pp. 31-36. Per the Scheduling Order, plaintiffs were required to

provide full Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b )(4) ("Rule 26(b )(4)") expert disclosures by
September 16, 2013. R. p. 33. Plaintiffs failed to disclose the identity or opinions of any expert
witnesses by that date. R. pp. 74-76.
1

As a result, defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Late Disclosed Experts and a
memorandum and affidavit in support ("Motion to Strike").

R. pp. 62-82.

In the motion,

defendants requested that the trial court preclude plaintiffs from offering any expert witness
testimony as a sanction under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 16(i) and 26(b )(4) for failure to
comply with the Scheduling Order. R. pp. 66-72. In response, plaintiffs filed a brief expert
witness disclosure, but only provided the names and addresses of Dr. Kurt Birkenhagen and
Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D. R. pp. 86-87. It provided no opinions or any of the other required Rule
26(b )(4) information. R. pp. 86-87.
Subsequently, defendants received plaintiffs' Answers and Responses to Defendants'
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, which provided some
additional information about Dr. Birkenhagen and Nancy Collins, Ph.D., but which still failed to
disclose all of the required Rule 26(b)(4) information. R. pp. 151, 155-59.
Plaintiffs conceded they had missed their expert witness disclosure deadline in this
matter. R. pp. 103, 110.
Defendants additionally requested the trial court strike plaintiffs' untimely disclosed
experts and preclude their testimony as a sanction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(4)
("Rule 26(e)(4)") for failure to provide complete responses to defendants' discovery requests
regarding their experts. R. pp. 135-49.
The trial court heard oral argument on the Motion to Strike on October 9, 2013. R. p.
216. The trial court ruled from the bench that plaintiffs' late disclosed experts would not be
allowed to testify, with the exception of Dr. Birkenhagen, whose testimony would be limited to
those opinions disclosed up to, and through, September 30, 2013-- which did not include

2

causation opinions. This ruling was memorialized in the trial court's October 24, 2013, written
decision, which addressed all of the pending motions. R. pp. 216-223.

2. Defendants' Initial Motion For Summary Judgment
Based upon the Court's ruling regarding the motion to strike, plaintiffs were very limited
in the expert witness testimony that could be presented at trial. Defendants subsequently filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Initial Motion for Summary Judgment") and supporting
documents to further address the repercussions of plaintiffs' lack of expert witness testimony. R.
pp. 189-210. Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds: (1) plaintiffs had no expert
witness testimony to support their claim that Dr. Hanson was negligent during the surgery and

during the repair of the colon; and (2) plaintiffs had no expert witness to testify as to causation.
R. pp. 191-200.
Plaintiffs conceded they could not proceed with a claim of negligence during the surgery
or during the repair of the colon. R. p. 268. However, they disputed causation. R. p. 268.
This motion was scheduled for hearing on November 21, 2013, but continued by the
Court to be heard on December 5, 2013. The trial court ultimately did not decide the causation
issue from the Initial Motion for Summary Judgment, as it was made moot by the trial court's
ruling on the subsequent motion to strike that plaintiffs' sole expert, Dr. Birkenhagen. If the trial
court's decision regarding Dr. Birkenhagen's lack of foundation is overturned by this appellate
court, then the trial court will have to decide the causation issue on remand.

3. Defendants' Motion to Strike Dr. Birkenhagen/Motion for Summary Judgment
On October 29, 2013, defendants deposed Dr. Birkenhagen. Following this deposition,
defendants filed their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expe1i Dr. Birkenhagen. R. pp. 23451.

In this motion, defendants argued that Dr. Birkenhagen had not met the foundational
3

requirements under Idaho Code § 6-1013 to testify to the applicable local community standard of
health care practice. R. pp. 236-44.
Plaintiffs initially filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed
Expe1i Dr. Birkenhagen ("Objection"), in which plaintiffs argued that the Motion to Strike was
untimely because it should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. R. pp. 401-04.
Briefing was submitted regarding this issue as well as the underlying motion for summary
judgment issues.
At the November 21, 2013, hearing set for these motions (and the Initial Motion for
Summary Judgment), the trial court proposed defendants' motion to strike be treated as a motion
for summary judgment, as requested by plaintiffs, and further proposed the hearing on the matter
be continued for two additional weeks to provide proper time to respond by the plaintiffs. R. p.
614. The parties agreed to the court's proposal and agreed to treat Defendants' Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert Dr. Birkenhagen as a motion for summary judgment. R. p. 614. On
appeal, plaintiffs have not alleged any error relative to treating the motion to strike as a motion
for summary judgment.
The court held the hearing on the Motion to Strike Dr. Birkenhagen/Motion for Summary
Judgment on December 5, 2013. See Tr. Vol I. pp. 1-74.
On January 3, 2014, the trial court entered its Decision on Motions for Summary
Judgment and Other Motions. R. pp. 606-22. The trial court held that plaintiffs had not met
their burden to establish the proper foundation for Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony.

R. p. 619.

Since plaintiffs had not established the proper foundation for Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony, the
court found it to be inadmissible. R. p. 619. Since this was plaintiffs' only expert witness, the

4

com1 found plaintiffs could not support their claims for medical malpractice and granted
summary judgment in defendants' favor. R. p. 619.

4. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief From Order Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial
Before the court entered its decision granting summary judgment in defendants' favor,
plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Order Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial ("Motion for
Relief'), which sought to extend the expert witness disclosure deadline further to allow plaintiffs
to offer previously undisclosed expert testimony on causation. See R. pp. 254-57. Defendants
opposed the motion and argued that plaintiffs had not demonstrated good cause to modify the
scheduling order. R. pp. 303-25. The trial court denied plaintiffs' Motion for Relief on the
grounds that the court would not allow the plaintiffs to circumvent the court's prior decision,
which limited plaintiffs' experts and their testimony as a sanction for plaintiffs' prior failures to
timely disclose their experts and their opinions. R. pp. 608-09.

5. Plaintiffs' Motions to Vacate the Trial Date
Additionally, before the trial court entered its decision granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants, plaintiffs filed an original and renewed motion to continue the trial date.
Ultimately, the relief requested by plaintiffs in their renewed motion to vacate trial was granted.
In the first motion (filed on December 2, 2013, and heard and decided on December 5, 2013),
plaintiffs requested the vacation of the January 14, 2014, trial setting on the basis they were not
going to meet the discovery deadline regarding the depositions of Dr. Hanson and defendants'
expert witnesses. R. pp. 452-56. Defendants offered to stipulate to an extension. R. pp. 552,
558, 562; see also Tr. Vol. I. p. 8, LL. 7-11. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion at the
December 5, 2013, hearing, on the basis defendant's agreement to the extension resolved the
basis for plaintiffs' motion. Tr. Vol. I. p. 9, LL. 12-18.
5

Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to continue trial on December 17, 2013, again asking
the court to vacate the January 14, 2014, trial date on the basis plaintiffs had been unable to take
several depositions.

In their briefing, defendants demonstrated the delays in taking the

depositions were caused, in large part, by plaintiffs' continued rejection of proffered deposition
dates. 1 See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial
Setting (Renewed), pp. 4-5. (Augmented Record). At the December 20, 2013, hearing, the trial
court vacated the January 14, 2014, trial date and tentatively reset the same for February 11,
Tr. (Augmented Record) p. 4, LL. 21-24. Trial was ultimately not held on that date

2014.

because, as noted above, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on
January 3, 2014.
C. Statement of Facts
This case arises out of the care and treatment of Mr. Samples by Dr. Hanson in October
of 2009.

On October 2, 2009, Mr. Samples presented to the emergency room at Bingham

Memorial Hospital with complaints of abdominal pain.

R. p. 466.

It was determined Mr.

Samples needed his gallbladder removed and he was taken to surgery. R. p. 466.
During the surgery, a small tear of the colon occurred, which 1s a recognized
complication of the gallbladder removal.

Dr. Hanson repaired the tear.

1

R. pp. 351, 355

Plaintiffs assert that they sought to depose Dr. Hanson and his experts from "June through October." See
Appellants' Brief, p. 1. This is incorrect. In June of 2013, plaintiffs' counsel only submitted a letter stating that
plaintiffs' counsel would like some dates for depositions, but it did not specify for whom, and plaintiffs did not
request the deposition of Dr. Hanson until November 27, 2013. See Tr. VoL Ip. 7, LL 3-14. Further, in October of
2013, plaintiffs' counsel advised he would like to depose defendants' experts after defendants' expert disclosures
were made. R. p. 557. Defendants' expert disclosures were not even due until approximately November 13, 2013,
pursuant to the district court's order entered on October 24, 2013, because of plaintiffs' failure to timely disclose
their experts and the resulting extension of defendants' deadline. R. p. 222. Finally, defendants provided numerous
deposition dates for Dr. Hanson and defendants' experts, but plaintiffs' counsel rejected all dates offered. See
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting (Renewed), pp. 4-5
(Augmented Record).
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(Birkenhagen Depo., p. 25, LL. 13-25 and p. 26, LL. 4-86). Plaintiffs' own proposed expert, Dr.
Birkenhagen, conceded that Dr. Hanson's care and treatment during the surgery, including the
repair of the colon, was within the standard of care. See R. pp. 351,355. Dr. Birkenhagen only
took issue with the post-operative care provided by Dr. Hanson. See R. p. 355.
On October 3, 2009, Mr. Samples became hypoxic, which means he had reduced oxygen
reaching body tissue. See R. p. 468.

On the morning of October 4, 2009, Mr. Samples was

transferred to Portneuf Medical Center (hereinafter "PMC") by Dr. Llinas, the Bingham
Memorial Hospital hospitalist, because Bingham Memorial Hospital did not have a
pulmonologist on staff and Mr. Samples needed a higher level of care due to his respiratory
issues. R. pp. 352, 468.

Dr. Llinas contacted Dr. Steven Krawtz at PMC to arrange for the

transfer of Mr. Samples to PMC for management of Mr. Samples' respiratory condition, and Mr.
Samples was transferred on the morning of October 4, 2009. R. pp. 352,468.
Although the factual background is clear from the record before the trial court and should
not be at issue on appeal, plaintiffs have made numerous inaccurate statements in their
Appellants' Brief, which will be addressed below to clarify the actual facts before the trial court. 2
First, plaintiffs assert, without citation to the record, that Mr. Samples' hypoxic condition
on October 3, 2009, was the "result of an ongoing leak" in the transverse colon. See Appellants'
Brief, p. 3.

This assertion is not supported by the record.

Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr.

Birkenhagen, conceded that an adult can suffer respiratory distress in situations where there is no
colon leak. R. p. 351 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 23, LL. 15-18). Therefore, respiratory distress
does not necessarily indicate that Mr. Samples was suffering from an "ongoing leak" at that time.
2

It should also be noted that plaintiffs failed, in nearly all instances, to provide any specific citation to the record

for their inaccurate statements of facts.
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Second, plaintiffs represent to this Court that the transverse colon "had not been repaired
by Dr. Hanson." See Appellants' Brief, p. 3.

Plaintiffs' representation is incorrect. Not only

was the colon repaired by Dr. Hanson, but plaintiffs' own expert conceded that Dr. Hanson's
repair met the standard of care. R. pp. 351, 355 (Deposition of W. Kurt Birkenhagen, M.D.,
hereinafter ("Birkenhagen Depo."), p. 25, LL. 13-25; p. 26, LL. 4-8).
Third, plaintiffs assert, without citation to the record, that Mr. Samples was treated by Dr.
Birkenhagen "upon his transfer from BMH to PMC the morning of October 4, 2009." See
Appellants' Brief, p. 3. 3 This is incorrect. Mr. Samples was not seen by Dr. Birkenhagen until
approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 5, 2009, approximately 36 hours after the patient arrived at
PMC. R. pp. 352,353 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 35, L. 18 through p. 36, L. 8; p. 38, LL. 16-25).
Fourth, plaintiffs allege Mr. Samples was exhibiting signs of "sepsis and infection" upon
his transfer on the morning of October 4, 2009, "because Dr. Hanson failed to detect and repair
an ongoing leak in David's transverse colon" following the gallbladder removal. See Appellants'
Brief, p. 3. These allegations are inaccurate, at best, and are clearly inconsistent with the record
before the trial court. The record is clear that neither a wound infection, nor a leak of the
transverse colon, nor a septic condition were present upon Mr. Samples' transfer to PMC on
October 4, 2009. Further, the record does not support plaintiffs' contention that such conditions
were caused by a colon leak prior to Mr. Samples' transfer to PMC.
Nobody at PMC, including Dr. Birkenhagen, diagnosed Mr. Samples with a wound
infection, leak of the transverse colon, or septic condition upon his admission to PMC on the

3

It should also be noted that plaintiffs assert Dr. Birkenhagen was "employed" by PMC. See Appellants' Brief, p.
3. However, there is nothing in the record to establish that Dr. Birkenhagen was "employed" by PMC at the time of
the transfer.

8

morning of October 4, 2009.

Dr. Birkenhagen himself did not diagnose a "wound infection"

until October 5, 2009, which was Mr. Samples' second day at PMC and approximately 36 hours
after transfer.

R. p. 352 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 36, LL. 3-15).

Dr. Birkenhagen did not

diagnose a leak or septic condition until he performed a surgery, another two days later, on
October 7, 2009, which was Mr. Sample's fourth day at PMC and approximately 80 hours after
the patient had been transferred. R. p. 353 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 40, LL. 5-11). Prior to that
date, according to Dr. Birkenhagen's own testimony, Dr. Birkenhagen did not diagnose Mr.
Samples as having a colon leak or a colon perforation. R. p. 354 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 50, L.
23 through p. 51, L. 2). In fact, Dr. Birkenhagen conceded that he could not answer the question
of whether the repair to the colon during surgery broke down or whether something else
happened to cause the leak. R. p. 356 (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 30, LL. 6-16).
In addition to the foregoing issues with plaintiffs' statement of facts, plaintiffs also argue
that Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavits established certain facts. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-6. It is
defendants' position that Dr. Birkenhagen's affidavit did not establish facts for purposes of the
underlying record and could not do so unless and until it was admitted by the Court. Plaintiffs'
contentions

regarding

the

facts

established by the

affidavit

are

simply plaintiffs'

characterizations of Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit. Cf Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-6; R. pp. 437-41.
Some of plaintiffs' descriptions of Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit misconstrue, omit, or add to the
statements within the affidavit itself. Cf Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-6; R. pp. 437-41. 4

4 For instance, plaintiffs assert that Dr. Birkenhagen was hired to "replace" Dr. Hanson. See Appellants' Brief, pp.
4-5. Although his affidavit discloses that Dr. Birkenhagen was his immediate predecessor, there is no information in
the record specifying that Dr. Birkenhagen was hired for the purposes of replacing Dr. Hanson.
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For example, plaintiffs assert that Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit established that Dr.
Birkenhagen "was board certified in surgery and a member of the American College of
Surgeons." Appellants' Brief, p. 4. Significantly, however, a review of his affidavit shows that
Dr. Birkenhagen was not board certified or a member of the American College of Surgeons at
the time of his affidavit and his affidavit does not state whether Dr. Birkenhagen was board
certified or a member of the American College of Surgeons in September/October 2009. See R.
p. 438. It simply states, "I was, until recently, board certified in surgery and a member of the
American College of Surgeons." R. p. 438. The record discloses no information as to whether
his lack of affiliation and lack of board certification were "recent" in terms of days, months,
years, or any other information to allow one to determine when his board certification and
membership lapsed, was revoked, or otherwise terminated.
Additionally, plaintiffs assert that Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit established that he
"reviewed the qualifications and community standards expected of a similarly qualified surgeon
to that of the Defendant, Dr. Ray W. Hanson in the community as of 2009." Appellants' Brief,
p. 5. However, on these topics, Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit stated only that he reviewed Dr.
Hanson's qualifications and the standards expected of a similarly qualified surgeon. R. p. 438.
Nothing in his statements on these topics indicated that his review was in any way specific to
2009, as plaintiffs would lead this Court to believe. He did not even identify the "qualifications"
or the "standards expected of a similarly qualified surgeon" he purportedly reviewed, let alone
describe whether the same were specific to, or applicable to, the relevant time period of 2009.

10

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs did not provide a list of the issues presented on appeal as required by Idaho
Appellate Rule 35(a)( 4). Defendants submit the only issues properly before this Court on appeal
are as follows:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden to demonstrate that Dr. Birkenhagen had the appropriate foundation to
testify to the applicable local community standard of health care practice.
2. Whether defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 (a) and 41.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND DR. BIRKENHAGEN'S TESTIMONY
REGARDING THE LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARD OF HEAL TH CARE
PRACTICE WAS INADMISSIBLE.

The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike, which had been converted into a
motion for summary judgment. The basis for the trial court's dismissal was that plaintiffs'
expert, Dr. Birkenhagen, did not have the required foundation to testify as to standard of care.
The trial court's dismissal was appropriate.
A. Standard of Review

Although plaintiffs identified the general standard of review for a motion for summary
judgment, plaintiffs did not identify the specific standard of review applicable to a trial court's
evidentiary rulings when challenged on appeal. The trial court's dismissal of this action was
based upon the court's determination that plaintiffs had failed to establish that their proposed
expert, Dr. Birkenhagen, was appropriately qualified to testify as to the local community
standard of health care practice. R. p. 619. Thus, for purposes of determining the specific
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standard of review applicable on appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling that
Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony was inadmissible. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review
clearly is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
"The admissibility of the expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from
whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude
summary judgment." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163, 45 P.3d at 819 (citing Kolin v. Saint Luke's
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868
P.2d 1224 (1994)). Significantly, the liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard
does not apply, however, when deciding whether or not testimony offered in connection with a
motion for summary judgment is admissible. Id. (citing Kolin, 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142;
Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224). Instead, when deciding whether or not testimony
offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible, the trial court must
look at the witness's affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts
which, if taken as true, would render the testimony of that witness admissible.

Id. (citing

Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224.
"A district court's evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court unless there has
been a clear abuse of discretion." McDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care Grp.-Idaho, LLC, 144
Idaho 219, 222, 159 P.3d 856, 859 (2007). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, this
Court considers three questions: "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Id. at 221-22, 159 P.3d at 858-59.
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B. Plaintiffs Failed to Provide the Foundation Required by Idaho Code§ 6-1013 for
Dr. Birkenhagen's Testimony.
The trial court appropriately found Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony regarding standard of
care was inadmissible. The trial court found the testimony to be inadmissible because plaintiffs
had not met their burden to establish the foundation required by Idaho Code § 6-1013 for Dr.
Birkenhagen's standard of care testimony.

R. p. 619. Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires a plaintiff

to demonstrate that his expert witness has actual knowledge of the applicable community
standard of care before such testimony may be admissible. The trial court found plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate their expert witness had such knowledge because plaintiffs had not
presented evidence to establish (1) that Dr. Birkenhagen practiced within the "community" at
issue or, (2) alternatively, that Dr. Birkenhagen had familiarized himself with the applicable local
community standard of health care practice.

R. pp. 614-19.

Dr. Birkenhagen was plaintiffs'

only standard of care expert. Since Dr. Birkenhagen was plaintiffs' sole standard of care expert,
and since Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony was inadmissible due to plaintiffs' failure to establish the
requisite foundation, the court found plaintiffs could not offer the testimony required under Idaho
law to avoid summary judgment. R. pp. 614-19. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants. R. p. 619.
In order to show the trial court erred in finding Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony
inadmissible, plaintiffs have to show that the court committed a clear abuse of its discretion. See

Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 337 P.3d 627, 632 ( 2014).
Plaintiffs have not and cannot demonstrate that the trial comi committed a clear abuse of
discretion. The trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the
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boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and reached its
decision through an exercise of reason as set forth below.
First, the trial court recognized that rulings relating to the admissibility of an expert
witness's testimony are discretionary. See R. pp. 614-15 (setting forth Dulaney 's descriptions of
the standards for evidentiary rulings relating to the admissibility of expert testimony). Plaintiffs
have not argued or cited to any portions of the record or transcript to indicate otherwise.
Second, the trial court's decision was reached through an exercise of reason. Plaintiffs
have not argued or offered any support to show that the trial court failed to reach its decision on
the admissibility of Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony through an exercise of reason. Since plaintiffs
have not argued or offered any support for the same, defendants respectfully submit that
plaintiffs have failed to establish the trial court somehow failed to reach its decision through an
exercise of reason. Moreover, a review of the record discussed herein shows the trial court
absolutely reached its decision through the exercise of reason.
Third, the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards when it found Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony was inadmissible.
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court appropriately found plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that Dr. Birkenhagen had the requisite actual knowledge of the applicable local
community standard of health care practice because plaintiffs had not presented evidence to
establish that Dr. Birkenhagen practiced within the "community'' at issue or that Dr.
Birkenhagen had familiarized himself with the applicable local community standard of health
care practice. R. pp. 614-19.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in so deciding, but

plaintiffs have not established, and cannot establish, that the trial court's decisions were outside
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the boundaries of its discretion, or inconsistent with any of the applicable legal standards at
issue, as set forth in further detail below.
1.
Plaintiffs Failed to Show Dr. Birkenhagen Practiced in the Applicable
"Community" At the Relevant Time.

The trial court found that plaintiffs had failed to establish the requisite foundation for Dr.
Birkenhagen' s testimony. R. p. 619.

This was, in part, because plaintiffs failed to meet their

burden to support their claim that Dr. Birkenhagen was not an out-of-area expert. R. p. 617. In
other words, the trial court found plaintiffs had failed to support their claim that Dr. Birkenhagen
practiced in the "community" at issue for purposes ofldaho Code§ 6-1012. See generally R. p.
617. Idaho Code § 6-1012 defines "community" as the geographical area ordinarily served by
the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the care was provided or allegedly should
have been provided. See I.C. § 6-1012. Plaintiffs failed to present any facts to demonstrate that
Pocatello-where Dr. Birkenhagen practiced in 2009-was within the geographical area
ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital. R. p. 617.

Since plaintiffs failed to present

any such evidence, the trial court held plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish the
foundation for Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony through this method. R. p. 617.
On appeal, plaintiffs mischaracterize this decision. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred in concluding that Dr. Birkenhagen was an "out-of-area" expert who must familiarize
himself with the standard of care within the community. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 13-15. This
contention is incorrect on its face because the trial comi did not find Dr. Birkenhagen was an
"out-of-area" expert. See R. p. 617. Rather, the trial court found plaintiffs had failed to meet

their burden to establish the foundation for Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony because they failed to
support their claim that Dr. Birkenhagen was not an out-of-area expert. R. p. 617.
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The

basis for this ruling was that plaintiffs did not offer any evidence that Pocatello was within the
geographical area ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009. R. p. 617.
Plaintiffs then mistakenly argue that the trial court's decision "is contrary to recent case
law that the 'geographical scope of the community is a factual issue' that must be viewed in
favor of the Plaintiffs as the non-moving party." See Appellants' Brief, p. 13 (citing Bybee v.

Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 335 P.3d 14 (2014). Defendants respectfully submit that plaintiffs'
characterization of this Court's holding in Bybee is erroneous and further submits that the trial
court's decision in this matter was, in fact, consistent with Bybee.
In Bybee, the defendant physician had moved for summary judgment. Id. 335 P.3d at 17.
In response, the plaintiffs submitted several affidavits of proposed experts, including affidavits
from Dr. Osborn, who was plaintiffs' standard of care expert. Id. The defendant filed a motion
to strike the affidavits. Id. 335 P.3d at 18. "[T]he district court concluded that Dr. Osborn's
affidavits were inadmissible because they failed to demonstrate that he was familiar with the
applicable standard of health care practice for the relevant community as required by Idaho Code
§ 6-1012." Id.

"The district court found that the relevant community was Idaho Falls, and

because Dr. Osborn practiced in Pocatello, not Idaho Falls, he was not qualified to testify as to
the applicable standard of health care practice in Idaho Falls." Id. "Having found Dr. Osborn's
testimony to be inadmissible, the district comi granted [defendant's] motion for summary
judgment." Id. Plaintiffs appealed this decision. Id.
On appeal, this Court had to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding
plaintiffs' proposed expert testimony where the trial court found the proposed expert was not
within the "community" at issue for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-1012.

Id. 335 P.3d at 18-22.

This Court stated that, to be admissible, plaintiffs' medical expert "must show that he or she is
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familiar with the standard of health care practice for the relevant medical specialty, during the
relevant timeframe, and in the community where the care was provided." Id. 335 P.3d at 19
(emphasis added) (citing Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 116, 254 P.3d 11, 17 (2011);

Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002)). This
Court stated that "the medical expert must explain 'how he or she became familiar with that
standard of care.'" Id. (quoting Dulaney, 13 7 Idaho at 164, 45 P .3d at 820 (emphasis added)).
This Court recognized that "Idaho Code Section 6-1013's foundation requirements for
the admissibility of expert testimony require plaintiffs to show how the expert is familiar with the
standard of health care practice for the community at issue." Id. 335 P.3d at 20 (citing Ramos,
144 Idaho at 37, 156 P.3d at 538).

Thus, this Court held that "a threshold matter to the

admissibility of the expert's testimony is defining the community." Id.
To define the "community" for purposes addressing this threshold matter, this Court
turned to Idaho Code § 6-1012.

In that section, the term "community" is defined as "that

geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such
care was or allegedly should have been provided." LC. § 6-1012 (emphasis added). This Court
explained that the legislature chose to define "community" by reference to the locations from
which the patient base of the hospital is derived.

Id. 335 P.3d at 21.

Thus, "[i]fusers of the

hospital's services commonly go from one location to the place where the hospital is located,
then that location falls within the geographical area which constitutes the community." Id.
Significantly, this Court noted that the trial court is responsible for determining the
geographical scope of the community pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 104(a). See Id., fn. 4
(citing I.R.E. 104(a)). Although Idaho Rule of Evidence 104(a) places that responsibility upon
the trial court, the Court noted that the trial court should refrain from resolving conflicting
17

factual disputes. Id. The Court stated that the trial court should "simply determine 'whether, for
the purposes of surviving summary judgment,' the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence." Id.
(citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 7,205 P.3d 650,656 (2009)).
In light of those rules, this Court held the trial court in Bybee had erred to the extent the
court viewed the geographical scope of the community as a legal, rather than a factual,
determination. Id.

However, this Court found this error to be harmless because it found the

only evidence offered by plaintiff as to whether Pocatello was within the geographical area
ordinarily served by Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (hereinafter (EIRMC") in Idaho
Falls was insufficient to satisfy the foundational requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012 and § 61013. Id. 335 P.3d at 21-22. This Court explained the evidence-in the form of an affidavit
statement-was insufficient as follows:
This statement does not identify the basis of Dr. Osborn's knowledge as to where
EIRMC patients come from and, more importantly, it does not attempt to identify,
or even approximate, the frequency which patients from Pocatello elect to receive
services at EIRMC as opposed to Portneuf Medical Center, Bingham Memorial
Hospital, MVH or other hospitals.

Id. In the absence of such evidence, this Court held that the trial court's error was harmless. Id.
In the case at bar, Judge Nye considered Dr. Birkenhagen's affidavit and deposition
testimony and appropriately concluded it failed to meet plaintiffs' burden to show Dr.
Birkenhagen had the requisite foundation to testify to the applicable local community standard of
health care practice.

R. p. 619.

Employing common sense consistent with this Court's

precedent, Judge Nye recognized that Pocatello could be considered part of the geographical area
ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital. R. p. 617. Judge Nye found, however, that
plaintiffs had presented no evidence to show that Pocatello was within the geographical area
ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009. R. p. 617.
18

Plaintiffs certainly had

not presented any evidence or testimony from Dr. Birkenhagen (or anyone else) to approximate
the frequency with which residents of Pocatello elect or receive services at Bingham Memorial
Hospital as opposed to PMC or other hospitals. 5
Since the trial court was not presented with any evidence relating to the area ordinarily
served by Bingham Memorial Hospital, the court did not resolve a "conflicting factual dispute;"
rather, the court simply determined the plaintiffs had not offered sufficient evidence to meet their
burden to establish their claim that Dr. Birkenhagen practiced in the community at issue (i.e.,
was not an out-of-area expert) for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-1012. R. p. 617. Judge Nye
appropriately found plaintiffs had not met their burden. R. p. 617.
Defendants submit Judge Nye's determination was consistent with this Court's decision
in Bybee, even though Bybee was decided after the trial court addressed this issue. Therefore,
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and acted consistently with the
applicable legal standards. At the very least, plaintiffs have not demonstrated on appeal that the
trial court abused its discretion with respect to its findings relating to the "community" in this
matter. Moreover, to the extent any alleged error was committed by the trial court, any such
error was harmless in the absence of any admissible evidence having been presented by plaintiffs
on the issue of the geographical area ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital.

5

It should be noted that on appeal, plaintiffs argue, without references to the record, that Dr. Birkenhagen
"obviously treated patients from Blackfoot .... " Appellants' Brief, p. 14. This argument is not supported hy the
record below. At most, the record shows one patient, Mr. Samples, was transferred from Bingham Memorial
Hospital to Portneuf Medical Center, because he needed a pulmonary specialist. See R. p. 440, 468. This does not
in any respect attempt to "approximate the frequency" with which residents from Pocatello "elect" to receive
services at Bingham Memorial Hospital for purposes of determining the "community" served by Bingham Memorial
Hospital.
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Finally, as an aside, from a policy perspective, the underlying facts of this case show that
Bingham Memorial Hospital and PMC provide different levels of medical care. Mr. Samples
had to be transfen-ed to PMC, a larger facility, because Bingham Memorial Hospital did not have
the specialty services of a pulmonologist. See R. pp. 440, 468. Therefore, the circumstances of
this patient alone show the standard of care between the two hospitals was different.
2. Plaintiffs Failed to Demonstrate Dr. Birkenhagen Had Familiarized Himself
With The Local Standard of Care.
The trial court also found that plaintiffs had failed to establish the requisite foundation for
Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony, in part, because plaintiffs had also not otherwise shown that Dr.
Birkenhagen had familiarized himself with the standard of health care practice for a general
surgeon in the area ordinarily served by Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009. See generally R.
pp. 616-19. Dr. Birkenhagen contended that a universal standard of care applied because Dr.
Hanson was a member of the American College of Surgeons and because Dr. Birkenhagen was
advised Dr. Hanson held himself out as a board certified surgeon. 6

Plaintiffs presented no

evidence to establish that Dr. Hanson held himself out to be board certified. Although Dr.
Birkenhagen alleged a universal standard existed, the trial court found he did not state how he
knew it to be applicable to Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009. R. pp. 618-19. The trial court
found that Dr. Birkenhagen's deposition testimony showed that Dr. Birkenhagen did not
communicate with anyone at Bingham Memorial Hospital about the standard of care in 2009 or
about whether the standard of care deviated from the standard of care in Pocatello in 2009, or
from any other standard.

R. p. 616.

Since Dr. Birkenhagen did not make any attempt to

Dr. Birkenhagen did not cite or produce any standards for membership in the American College of Surgeons, let
alone any standards relating specifically to 2009. Likewise, Dr. Birkenhagen did not cite to or produce any
standards for board certification for 2009 or any other time.
6
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familiarize himself with the applicable standard of care, the trial court found that plaintiffs had
failed to lay the necessary foundation for Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony. R. p. 619. As a result,
the trial court held that Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony was inadmissible. R. p. 619.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the evidence before the trial court established Dr.
Birkenhagen's familiarity with the applicable standard of care. See Appellants' Brief, p. 10.
However, it is clear from the evidence before the trial court, including the deposition excerpts
and Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit, that plaintiffs did not establish that Dr. Birkenhagen was
familiar with or had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice.
As this Court is well aware, plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action are required to
establish that their standard of care expert is familiar with the applicable local community
standard of health care practice. "Idaho Code Section 6-1012 requires a plaintiff bringing a
medical malpractice claim to prove by direct expert testimony that the defendant negligently
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice." Mattox v. L(fe Care Centers of
America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 337 P.3d 627, 632 ( 2014). "That standard is specific to 'the time

and place of the alleged negligence' and 'the class of health care provider that such defendant
then and there belonged to .... "' Id. (quoting LC. § 6-1012). "The defendant's care is judged
against 'similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community,
taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if any."'
Id. (quoting I.C. § 6-1012).

"If a plaintiff fails to provide such evidence, the defendant is

entitled to summary judgment." Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho
160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002).
When a plaintiff offers expe1i testimony in an attempt to provide such proof, Idaho Code
§ 6-1013 requires the plaintiff lay proper foundation for the expe1i's opinions by establishing:
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(a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said
opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such
expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with
actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which his or her
expert testimony is addressed ....
LC. § 6-1013. "In addition, the requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(e) apply to 'expert medical
testimony submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment."' Mattox, 337 P.3d at
632 (quoting Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820). Pursuant to that rule, "the party
offering an affidavit must show that the facts set forth therein are admissible, that the witness is
competent to testify regarding the subject of the testimony, and that the testimony is based on
personal knowledge." Id. (citing Dulaney, 13 7 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820). "Statements that are
conclusory or speculative do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency
under Rule 56(e)." Id. (quoting Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820). "As a result, '[a]n
expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must show that he or
she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care professional for the relevant
community and time" and "how he or she became familiar with that standard of care."' Id.
(quoting Dulaney, 13 7 Idaho at 164, 45 P .3d at 820).
To determine whether an affidavit satisfies these requirements, the guiding question is
"whether the affidavit alleges facts which, taken as true, show the proposed expert has actual
knowledge of the applicable standard of care." Id. "In addressing that question, courts must
look to the standard of care at issue, the proposed expert's grounds for claiming knowledge of
that standard, and determine-employing a measure of common sense-whether those grounds
would likely give rise to knowledge of that standard." Id.
The obligation of the plaintiff to demonstrate "actual knowledge" of the "local" standard
is a requirement imposed by law. See Id. (citing Frank v. E. Shoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho 480,
22

482, 757 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1988).

Whether the plaintiff has met this requirement 1s an

evidentiary ruling, which is appropriately within the purview of the trial court.
While plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court has upheld several methods by
which plaintiffs' experts can familiarize themselves with the standard of care, they are not
applicable to this case. 7 Plaintiffs cited to three cases referenced in Mattox and paraphrased the
descriptions in Mattox about the cases. 8 Cf Appellants' Brief, p. 10 with Mattox, 337 P.3d at
633.

Although defendants do not dispute that experts may familiarize themselves with the

applicable local community standard of health care practice through a number of methods, none
of the three cases cited by plaintiffs are analogous to the instant case. The case at bar does not
involve an expert witness who consulted with an anonymous local expert as in Bybee, or who
practiced alongside surgeons in the same city at the time of the alleged negligence as in
Newberry, or who relied upon licensing requirements as a purported basis for knowledge of the

applicable standard of care as in Grover. Accordingly, the methods for familiarization provided
as examples by plaintiffs were simply not present in the instant matter.
Despite the distinctions from the cases cited, plaintiffs argue that the evidence before the
trial court established Dr. Birkenhagen's familiarity with the applicable standard of care.
Appellants' Brief, p. 10. Before the trial court, plaintiffs contended that the applicable standard

7

See Appellants' Brief, p. I 0.

8

The three cases included the following: Bybee v. Cannan, 157 Idaho 169, 178-89, 335 P.3d 14, 23-24 (2014);
Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,292 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005); and Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247,253, 46
P.3d 1105, 1105 (2002).
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of care for post-surgical care was "national" or "universal." See R. pp. 432, 441. On appeal, it is
unclear whether plaintiffs contend the standard was local, statewide, national, or universal. 9
Each of plaintiffs' arguments in support of their contention that Dr. Birkenhagen was
familiar with the unidentified standard of care is addressed below. As an initial matter, plaintiffs
assert that Dr. Birkenhagen was familiar with the applicable standard of care because he obtained
privileges at Bingham Memorial Hospital some two years after the subject 2009 surgery, in April
of 2011. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 10-11. Defendants have not disputed that Dr. Birkenhagen
may have been familiar with the applicable standard of care at Bingham Memorial Hospital in
2011. However, it is clear Dr. Birkenhagen was not familiar with the applicable standard of care

in 2009, and the applicable standard of care is time specific.

See Mattox, 337 P.3d at 632

( standard of care under LC. § 6-1012 is specific to the time and place of the alleged negligence).
Next, plaintiffs argue Dr. Birkenhagen stated he believes the minimum standard of care
in Blackfoot, Idaho, was no different in 2009, than when he arrived in 2011. See Appellants'
Brief, p. 11; see also R. p. 438.

In Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit, he stated this belief was based

upon his review of Dr. Hanson's "qualifications" and the standards expected of a "similarly
qualified surgeon." R. p. 438. However, the trial court found there was nothing in the record to
show there was anything in Dr. Hanson's "qualifications" that articulated the local community
standard of care in Blackfoot in 2009.

See R. p. 619.

Plaintiffs did not produce the

"qualifications" reviewed, nor did Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit or other testimony describe the
same.

At one point in their brief, plaintiffs argue Dr. Birkenhagen should have been permitted to opine regarding a
statewide or national standard of care. It is unclear if plaintiffs were arguing this in the alternative or if that is their
position relative to the standard.
9
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Plaintiffs argue that the standard of care in Blackfoot, Idaho, in 2009, was the same as in
2011, and contend this was confirmed by Dr. Birkenhagen's assessment that "Dr. Hanson was
holding himself out as a general surgeon, previously board-certified and previous member of the
American College of Surgeons."

See Appellants' Brief, p. 11.

This argument relates to

plaintiffs' contention before the trial court that Dr. Birkenhagen was familiar with the standard of
care "applicable" to Dr. Hanson by virtue of being "board-certified" in the same specialty as Dr.
Birkenhagen. 10

Plaintiffs relied upon Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P .3d 11

(2011) and Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828, 828 P.2d 854, 857 (1992). Neither case
supports plaintiffs' argument. Both of those cases hold that although a board certified specialist
is presumed to be knowledgeable of the class of specialists of which the defendant is a member,
the plaintiffs expert must still demonstrate actual knowledge of the local community

standard of care. See Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 118, 254 P.3d at 19; Kozlowski, 121 Idaho at
828, 828 P.2d at 857.

To demonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of care or

familiarization with the same in accordance with Idaho Code § 6-1013( c ), the Kozlowski Court
held that a specialist must demonstrate two elements:
1) First, that he is board-certified in the same specialty as that of the defendantphysician; this demonstrates knowledge of the appropriate standard of care of
board-certified physicians practicing in the specialty in question.
2) Second, an out-of-the-area doctor must inquire of the local standard in order to
insure there are no local deviations from the national standard under which the
defendant-physician and witness-physician were trained.

10

Dr. Birkenhagen did not actually state anywhere in the record that he was board certified in 2009.
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See Kozlowski, 121 Idaho at 828, 828 P.2d at 857 (citing Buck v. St. Clair, 108 Idaho 743, 74647, 702 P.2d 781, 784-85 (1985)). 11
Defendants argued that plaintiffs could not satisfy either of the elements required by

Kozlowski and Suhadolnik. See R. pp. 536-40. First, defendants argued that plaintiffs could not
show that Dr. Birkenhagen was board certified in the same specialty as Dr. Hanson because Dr.
Hanson was not board certified at the time of the alleged negligence. R. p. 536. Before the
hearing on the Motion to Strike Dr. Birkenhagen/Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants
submitted an affidavit from Dr. Hanson clarifying that he was not board certified at the time of
the alleged negligence.

R. p. 545. The trial court declined plaintiffs' request to strike this

supplemental affidavit of Dr. Hanson because the affidavit clarified the record. R. p. 613.
Second, defendants argued that plaintiffs could not show that Dr. Birkenhagen inquired
of the local standard in order to insure there were no local deviations from the alleged national
standard, as required by Idaho law. R. pp. 537-40. Defendants argued that Dr. Birkenhagen did
not inquire of any local specialist or otherwise confirm that the local standard of health care
practice had been replaced by a national standard of health care practice, without deviation.

R.

p. 537. The trial court agreed and held that Dr. Birkenhagen's deposition testimony clearly
established that Dr. Birkenhagen did not communicate with anyone about the applicable
standard of care as it existed in 2009 in Blackfoot, Idaho, or whether that standard of care in

11

The requirement that a board-certified physician still must inquire of the local standard is consistent with Idaho's
law, which allow for various levels of medical care within the state dependent, in part, upon available services,
equipment, and staff For instance, many of Idaho's rural hospitals still do not have pulmonologists, interventional
radiologists, vascular surgeons, cardiologists or neurosurgeons on staff, or full-time MRI capabilities available.
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2009 deviated in any manner from the standard in Pocatello in 2009 or any alleged national
standard. R. pp. 616,619.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding from the record before
the court that "Dr. Birkenhagen did not communicate with anyone at Bingham Memorial
Hospital about the relevant standard of care for a surgeon at the hospital in 2009 or about any
deviations in the standard in existence in Blackfoot from the standard in Pocatello in 2009." See
Appellants' Brief, p. 9. 12

Plaintiffs contend this finding is "inaccurate and misstates the

evidence" before the court at the time it ruled upon the motion. However, plaintiffs have not
identified anything in the record to show that Dr. Birkenhagen communicated with anyone at
Bingham Memorial Hospital about the relevant standard of care for a surgeon practicing there in
2009, or about any deviations in the standard in existence there from the standard in Pocatello in
2009.
At most, plaintiffs rely upon Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony wherein he stated that he spoke
with Anthony Davis ("Davis") about how things "should be done, are done, [and] would be done
at Bingham." See Appellants' Brief, p. 12. Plaintiffs' reliance upon this testimony is misplaced
for several reasons.

First, this testimony does not identify who Davis is or how Davis was

familiar with the applicable standard of care at Bingham in 2009. On appeal, plaintiffs assert
that Davis is a "local surgeon." See Appellants' Brief, 12. However, there is nothing in the
record identifying Davis as a "local surgeon." Second, even if Davis was a local surgeon, there
is nothing in the record to show Davis was familiar with the standard of health care practice
applicable to general surgeons at Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009, or that he was even
12

It should be noted appellants erroneously cited to "R.p.261" for the court's finding.
located at R. p. 616.
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The finding is actually

practicing there in 2009. Third, even if plaintiffs could have provided such information, (which
they did not), there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Dr. Birkenhagen actually learned
the standard of care applicable to surgeons such as Dr. Hanson practicing at Bingham Memorial
Hospital in 2009 through his conversation with Davis. Fourth, Dr. Birkenhagen never discussed
with Davis the standard of care regarding laparoscopic cholecystectomy and/or open
cholecystectomy with a tear in the colon.
Finally, during his deposition, Dr. Birkenhagen confirmed he did not talk to Davis about
the standard of care for a general surgeon practicing at Bingham Memorial Hospital in
September of 2009, as follows:
Q.... When you talked to Dr. Anthony Davis, did you talk to him about the standard of
care for a general surgeon practicing at Bingham Memorial Hospital in September of
2009?
A. No.

R. p. 251. (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 32, L. 23, p. 33, L. 2).
The testimony relied upon by plaintiffs simply does not show Dr. Birkenhagen
communicated with anyone at Bingham Memorial Hospital about the relevant standard of care
for a surgeon at the hospital in 2009, performing a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Therefore, the
trial court's finding that Dr. Birkenhagen did not communicate with anyone at Bingham
Memorial Hospital about the relevant standard of care of 2009 or about any applicable deviations
therefrom is accurate.
Despite these deficiencies in the testimony, plaintiffs attempt to analogize this case to

Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005), to support their apparent contention
that Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony regarding his discussion with Davis was sufficient to
demonstrate how he familiarized himself with the applicable standard of care. See Appellants'
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Brief, p. 12. However, Newberry is distinguishable. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court had
to determine whether the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiffs' expert, an ophthalmologist,
to present testimony regarding whether the defendant doctor, a family practice physician,
breached the applicable standard of care. Newberry, 142 Idaho at 291-92, 127 P.3d at 194-95.
The defendant argued that the ophthalmologist expert lacked actual knowledge of the standard of
care applicable to a family practice physician because the expert did not testify at trial that he
had ever explicitly asked a family practice physician what the standard of care was in Twin Falls,
Idaho. Id. at 292, 127 P.3d at 195.

On appeal, the Court rejected that argument and held that

Idaho Code § 6-1013 does not dictate that actual knowledge be obtained by explicitly asking a
specialist in the relevant field to explain the local standard of care. Id.
Although the ophthalmologist expert in that case had not explicitly asked a local
specialist to explain the standard of care, the expert in that case had "practiced in the

~

community, Twin Falls, and at the same time as the events that gave rise to this action." Id.

( emphasis added). The ophthalmologist expert testified at trial that he had learned the standard
of care by practicing alongside family practice physicians in Twin Falls. Id. Since the expert
had so testified, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the testimony. Id.
Unlike Newberry, in this case, defendants are not arguing that Dr. Birkenhagen was
required to explicitly ask a specialist in the relevant field to explain the local standard of care. 13
Rather, defendants argue that Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony regarding his conversation with
Davis was insufficient to demonstrate his familiarity with the applicable standard of health care
It should be noted that to the extent plaintiffs argue for a statewide or national standard of care, plaintiffs were
still required to show how their expert determined there were no deviations from the same within the local standard
of care, which could have been done by consulting with a local specialist. There was no record of any such attempts
in this case.
13
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practice for the time, place, specialty and circumstances. Plaintiffs have offered nothing more
than a brief statement in Dr. Birkenhagen's deposition, which did not show how he could have
familiarized himself with the applicable standard of care through the conversation. Additionally,
unlike Newberry, Dr. Birkenhagen has not testified that he learned the applicable standard of
care by practicing alongside general surgeons at Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009. It is
undisputed that Dr. Birkenhagen practiced in Pocatello at that time.
Depo., p. 5, LL. 10-25).

R. p. 249 (Birkenhagen

Therefore, Newberry is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

It should also be noted that plaintiffs argue on appeal that the defendants and the trial

court "overlooked" Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony about his conversation with Davis.

See

Appellants' Brief, pp. 11-12. This is incorrect. Defendants themselves produced the testimony
(R. p. 251) (Birkenhagen Depo., p. 30, L. 24, p. 33, L. 2) and quoted the same (R. pp. 242-43).
Likewise, the trial court quoted the same testimony in its Decision on Motions for Summary
Judgment and Other Motions. R. p. 616.

Clearly, neither the defendants nor the trial court

"overlooked" the testimony. The testimony simply does not support plaintiffs' contentions.
Finally, plaintiffs argue, without citing the record, that the trial court erred in concluding
that a statewide or national standard of care did not apply because Dr. Hanson was not board
certified at the time of the surgery in October of 2009. See Appellants' Brief, p. 16. Plaintiffs'
argument is misplaced because the trial court did not merely conclude that a statewide or
national standard could not apply because Dr. Hanson was not board certified.

The comi held

that plaintiffs had not established that a national standard of care applied because Dr.
Birkenhagen had not made any effort at all to ensure that there were no deviations from any
national standard, as required by Idaho law. See R. pp. 616-19.
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The trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and appropriately found Dr.
Birkenhagen's testimony to be inadmissible.

The plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to

establish otherwise. Therefore, this decision should be upheld.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM SCHEDULING ORDER
A. Standard of Review for Request For Relief From Scheduling Order

Rule 16(b) only allows a court's scheduling order to be modified by leave of the judge
upon a showing of good cause. See Idaho R. Civ. Pro. l 6(b) ("A schedule shall not be modified
except by leave of the judge or magistrate upon a showing of good cause."); see also Weinstein
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010); Camp v. East
Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 859, 55 P.3d 304,313 (2002).

The Idaho Supreme Court "has consistently held that trial courts' decisions involving
application of a 'good cause' standard are discretionary decisions." Mercy Medical Center v.
Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008) (citing, e.g., Farrell v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390-91, 64 P.3d 304, 316-17 (2002); Camp v. E. Fork
Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 859, 55 P.3d 304, 313 (2002); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,

116, 29 P.3d 949, 952 (2001) (noting that "[b]ecause there is no fixed rule for determining what
constitutes good cause, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the district court.")).
The standard of review of such discretionary decisions is well established.

Mercy

~Medical Center, l 46 Idaho at 226, 192 P .3d at 1054. Abuse of discretion is determined by a

three part test which asks whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
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standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Id.
B. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Declining to Permit Plaintiffs to
Use This Motion to Circumvent Its Prior Order Sanctioning Plaintiffs for Their
Untimely Expert Witness Disclosures.
As an initial matter, it must be noted that plaintiffs did not specifically identify any
alleged error on the part of the trial court in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order
Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial and Notice of Hearing ("Motion for Relief') in their Notice of
Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal. R. pp. 626, 659. Further, plaintiffs did not identify the
issue regarding the Motion for Relief in any statement of issues on appeal in their Appellants'
Brief, in violation of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)( 4). Instead, plaintiffs merely touched on the
Motion for Relief late in their brief. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 18-20. Plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief is irrelevant to the issue on appeal and should not be considered for purposes of this
appeal. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, defendants will respond to the same.
The court appropriately denied this motion. Plaintiffs' Motion requested the trial court
modify its Pretrial Order to permit Plaintiffs' Second Amended Expert Witness Disclosure which
provided, for the first time, causation opinions of Dr. Birkenhagen. R. pp. 254-57. Plaintiffs
sought to add these untimely disclosed causation opinions in response to defendants' Initial
Motion for Summary Judgment, which sought summary judgment, in part, on the grounds
plaintiffs could not present any admissible evidence to establish causation. See R. pp. 189-210.
In response, defendants argued plaintiffs had not met their burden to demonstrate good cause,
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 6(i), to modify the scheduling order to permit Dr.
Birkenhagen's untimely disclosed causation opinions. R. pp. 303-25.
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The trial court heard oral argument on the matter and questioned plaintiffs' counsel as to
whether there was any cause to extend the discovery or disclosure deadlines. See Tr. Vol. I, p.
11, LL. 15-21.

Plaintiffs' counsel essentially argued that the disclosure deadline should be

extended because Dr. Birkenhagen was absent from the country following September 30th or
October 1st. See Tr. Vol. I, pp. 12-13. Defendants countered that plaintiffs should not be given
another discovery extension on these facts because Dr. Birkenhagen had testified that prior to the
expert disclosure deadline no one from plaintiffs' counsel office had contacted him for one or
two years. See Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-14. Since he had not been contacted for a year or two before
the expert disclosure, plaintiffs could not demonstrate good cause to extend the disclosure
deadline by simply relying upon the fact that Dr. Birkenhagen left the country sometime after
plaintiffs' court-ordered expert disclosure deadline. See generally Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-14.
The trial court denied plaintiffs' request to modify the court's scheduling order to permit
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Expert Witness Disclosure.

R. pp. 608-09. The court explained it

would "not modify the Scheduling Order to allow the Plaintiffs to circumvent the October
24, 2013 order, which did modify the disclosure dates of the Scheduling Order to provide
for Plaintiffs' failure to meet the initial discovery deadlines."

R. pp. 608-09 (emphasis

added). Accordingly, the court held Dr. Birkenhagen's opinion testimony would continue to be
limited by the requirements of the October 24, 2013, decision. 14 R. p. 609.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their
Motion for Relief. See Appellants' Brief, p. 20. However, plaintiffs cannot show the trial court
14

In the October 24, 2013, decision, the court "limited the expert opinion testimony from Dr. Birkenhagen to what
had been disclosed on or before September 30th as a sanction against Plaintiffs for failing to comply with the
Court's scheduling order and the deadlines for Rule 26(b)(4) disclosures." R. p. 222. Appellants have not alleged
error relative to the court's decision to impose this sanction in its October 24, 2013, decision.
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abused its discretion because the trial court recognized the decision as one of discretion, acted
with the boundaries of its discretion, and reached its decision through an exercise of reason.
First, plaintiffs have not set forth any argument or cited to any portion of the record or
transcript to show that the couii did not perceive the issue as a matter within its discretion.
Second, plaintiffs have not offered any argument or authority to demonstrate that the court's
denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was outside the boundaries of the court's discretion or
inconsistently with the applicable legal standards under the facts of this case. Third, plaintiffs
have not argued or shown that the trial court did not reach its decision through an exercise of
reason. Therefore, defendants respectfully submit that plaintiffs have not, and cannot, show that
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs' Motion for Relief.
Moreover, any alleged error with respect to the denial of plaintiffs' Motion for Relief is
harmless because it did not affect the result of this matter. The purpose of plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief was to attempt to add previously undisclosed causation opinions that had already been
effectively precluded by the trial court's prior order. At oral argument on the plaintiffs' Motion
for Relief, plaintiffs' counsel specifically stated that "[t]he point of the pretrial - relief from
pretrial order was simply to say that to the extent that the Court makes a ruling that because these
causations [sic] issues weren't disclosed in past discovery and in past disclosures, that we would
ask the Court to give us relief from that." Tr. Vol. I, p. 11, LL. 6-11.

When the trial court

issued its decision on the Initial Motion for Summary Judgment, the court did reach a decision
relative to defendants' argument regarding causation. R. pp. 619-20.

Instead, with respect to

the Initial Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court stated that it could not yet evaluate
causation due to plaintiffs' failure to establish that their expert had sufficiently familiaiized
himself with the applicable standard of care. R. pp. 619-20.
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Thus, the court did not decide

defendants' Initial Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of causation. R. pp. 619-20.
Since the court did not reach the question of causation on the Initial Motion for Summary
Judgment and since the issue did not affect its decision to dismiss the case, the decision did not
affect the result of the action. Accordingly, any alleged error with respect to the denial of
plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was harmless.
It is well settled that the Idaho Supreme Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged

error is harmless. Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 559, 261 P.3d 829, 836 (2011).
"If an error did not affect a party's substantial rights, or if the error did not affect the result of the

trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Id. (citing Myers v. Workmen's Auto
Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004)); see also Martin v. Hackworth, 127 Idaho
68, 70, 896 P.2d 976, 978 (1995); Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 608, 726
P .2d 706, 718 (1986).

Since this Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is

harmless and since any alleged error with respect to the denial of plaintiffs' Motion for Relief
was harmless, the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' Motion for Relief should be upheld.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' TWO MOTIONS TO
CONTINUE TRIAL WERE PROPER
A. Standard of Review for a Motion to Continue Trial

A decision to deny a motion for a trial continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the
trial court. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 398, 234 P.3d 716, 722 (2010); Villa Highlands, LLC v.
Western Community Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598,607,226 P.3d 540, 549 (2010) ("A decision to grant
or deny a motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court."); Gunter v.
Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 24, 105 P.3d 676,684 (2005) ("A decision to grant or deny a
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motion for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court."); Vendelin v. Costco
Wholesale Cmp., 140 Idaho 416,425, 95 P.3d 34, 43 (2004).
"In reviewing such a discretionary decision, this Court engages in a multi-tiered inquiry to

determine: (l) whether the lower court conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason." Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 425, 95 P.3d at 43 (citing State v.
Ransom, 124 ldaho 703,706,864 P.2d 149, 152 (1993)).

"The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was so arbitrary
that it deprived a litigant of a fundamentally fair tiial." Krepcik v. Tippett, l 09 Idaho 696, 699, 710
P.2d 606, 609 (Idaho App., 1985). The appellant bears the burden to establish that the denial of a
motion for continuance was so arbitrary that it deprived the appellant of a fundamentally fair ttial.
See Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho 273,275, 939 P.2d 849, 851

(1997) ("[I]n order to show that the trial comi abused its discretion, the appellant from denial of a
motion to continue trial must show that his or her substantial rights were prejudiced by denial of the
motion." (emphasis in original).
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Initial Motion to Vacate Trial Setting

Once again, it must be noted that plaintiffs did not identify any specific e1Tor on the part
of the trial court regarding their motions to continue trial in their Notice of Appeal or Amended
Notice of Appeal. R. pp. 626, 659. They did not allege any enor with respect to the decision on
plaintiffs' motions to continue trial. See R. pp. 626, 659. Plaintiffs did not identify the issue in
any statement of issues on appeal in their brief, again in violation of Idaho Appellate Rule
35(a)(4), but merely raised the argument relating to the motions to continue trial in their brief.
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See Appellants' Brief, pp. 18-20. Nevertheless, plaintiffs' alleged errors regarding the motions

to vacate trial are irrelevant to the main issue on appeal and should not be considered for
purposes of this appeal.

However, again out of an abundance of caution, defendants will

respond.
In their Motion to Vacate Trial, plaintiffs requested that the trial court vacate the January
14, 2014, trial setting on the grounds plaintiffs had not been able to take the depositions of Dr.
Hanson and defendants' expert witnesses before this deadline. R. pp. 452-456. In the affidavit
of plaintiffs' counsel in support of the same, plaintiffs' counsel expressed his concern that he
would be unable to meet the trial court's deadline of December 16, 2013, for taking such
depositions. R. p. 455.
In response, defendants offered to stipulate to an extension of their December 16, 2013,
deadline if necessary to allow plaintiffs to depose Dr. Hanson and defendants' experts.

R. pp.

552, 558. Defendants argued no prejudice would occur to the parties if plaintiffs were given
reasonable, additional time to conduct the depositions beyond the December 16, 2013, deadline. R.
p. 553. Additionally, defendants demonstrated, in the Affidavit of Jennifer K. Brizee in Support of
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting, delays in
taking the depositions were caused in large part by plaintiffs. R. pp. 556-562.
At the hearing on December 5, 2013, the court denied plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, LL. 12-18. The court stated, in pertinent part, the following:
Mr. Featherston, I guess I'm a little curious: Why should I grant a motion to
continue trial if the defendants are willing to work with you on getting the
depositions done, even if it means going beyond the discovery deadline?
This case is two years old since it was filed. It's four years old since the facts that
gave rise to the lawsuit. It's getting stale. And I understand you haven't asked
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for a continuance. There was a substantial period of time that there was a request
for a stay. I presume that was to do a pre-filing litigation. I don't know.
This case is getting old. And I'm pretty set in stone when it comes to disclosure
deadlines. But discovery deadlines I'm not so set in stone. I would prefer at this
point to say you may have after the December 16th day to complete your
discovery of witnesses who have already been disclosed. You can do depositions.
Let's hold to the trial date for now and see ifwe can get 'em done. Ifit turns out
that the scheduling won't allow it, then we'll talk again as it gets closer. But for
the time being, I'm going to grant I'm going to deny the motion to vacate the
trial setting. I'm going to grant the request to do the depositions after the
discovery deadline.
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8-9. Given these statements, it is clear that instead of vacating the trial, the trial
court granted plaintiffs' request to take depositions after the discovery deadline. Tr. Vol. I, p. 9,
LL. 15-18. In response, plaintiffs' counsel indicated the motion had simply been filed out of
caution apparently due, in part, because they contended they had not received communication
about extending the deadline for the depositions. See generally Tr. Vol. I, pp. 9-10.
Despite obtaining the requested extension, which served as the basis of their Motion to
Vacate Trial, plaintiffs contend on appeal that the trial court e1Ted in denying their Motion to
Vacate Trial.

See Appellants' Brief, p. 20. Plaintiffs have not met their burden on appeal to

establish their contention that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter.
First, plaintiffs have not set fo1ih any argument or cited to any portion of the record or
transcript to show the court did not perceive the issue as a matter within its discretion.
Defendants' opposition correctly identified the standard for denial of a motion to vacate trial as
one of discretion. R. pp. 551-552. When the trial court granted defendants' request for denial of
the motion for continuance, the trial court offered no indication it was relying upon any other
standard. See Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8-9. Given this, plaintiffs have not met their burden to show the
trial court failed to perceive the issue as a matter within its discretion.
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Second, plaintiffs have not met their burden to show the trial court acted outside the
boundaries of its discretion and inconsistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it. The trial court would only have been required to grant the Motion to
Vacate Trial if the denial of the same would have deprived the plaintiffs of a fundamentally fair
trial or otherwise prejudiced plaintiffs' substantial rights. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that they
were deprived of the opportunity to depose Dr. Hanson and defendants' experts. See Appellants'
Brief, p. 17. However, as noted above, the trial court granted plaintiffs' request to extend the
discovery deadline specifically to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to take such depositions. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 9, LL. 12-18. As a result, the court's "denial" of plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial did
not deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to depose Dr. Hanson and defendants' experts.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial was within the bounds of its discretion and was consistent
with the legal standards applicable to a motion to continue trial.
Third, plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that the trial court did not reach its
decision through an exercise of reason. Plaintiffs have offered no argument, citations to the
record, transcript, or otherwise, to demonstrate that the trial court failed to reach its decision
through an exercise of reason. The trial court's inquiries and reasoning regarding the motion set
fmih above clearly show the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.
In conclusion, defendants respectfully submit plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' initial
Motion to Vacate Trial. Moreover, even if the trial comi had erred in denying plaintiffs' Motion
to Vacate Trial, the error would have been harmless because, as set f01ih below, the trial court
ultimately vacated the trial following Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting [Renewed] and
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing and Notice of Hearing ("Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial").
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C. The Trial Court Granted Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial.

On December 20, 2013, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting
[Renewed] ("Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial") by vacating the trial date and moving it to
February 11, 2014. 15 See Tr. (Augmented Record) p. 4, LL. 21-24; p. 6, LL. 11-13. Despite the
trial court's clear decision granting the very relief plaintiffs requested, plaintiffs misrepresent to
this appellate court that the trial court denied their Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial.

See

Appellants' Brief, p. 18 (citing to the Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial and stating that the trial
court "denied all motions"). Not only do plaintiffs misrepresent the trial court's actual decision,
but then they claim that the trial court erred in denying its Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial. See
Appellants' Brief, p. 20 (alleging the trial court erred in denying its "motions to continue trial").
Since the trial court granted the plaintiffs' requested relief by vacating the trial, there is simply
no basis for an alleged error with respect to this motion and the issue is moot.
IV.
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

Under Idaho law, where a party requests attorney's fees on appeal but fails to present any
argument as to why the party is entitled to such fees, the Court will not address the issue because

15

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Vacate Trial sought to have the trial vacated based upon alleged issues relating to
completion of depositions of Dr. Hanson and defendants' experts. See R. 568-89 (counsel's affidavit setting forth
his understanding of the course of discovery). Defendants opposed the motion and submitted the Affidavit of
Jennifer K. Brizee in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting (Renewed) and the Supplemental
Affidavit of Jennifer K. Brizee in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting (Renewed), which clearly
demonstrated that defendants had provided 11 available dates for the deposition of Dr. Hanson and 8 available dates
for the depositions of defendants' experts. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Vacate Trial Setting (Renewed), pp. 4-5; (Augmented Record). See also R. p. 590-96 (which includes
correspondence outlining all the dates offered for the subject depositions) and Supplemental Affidavit of Jennifer K.
Brizee in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial Setting (Renewed), pp. 1-3 (Augmented Record).
Plaintiffs' counsel declined all of the dates provided and opted, instead, to pursue vacating the trial.
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the party has failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35. See Cuevas v. Barraza, 155 Idaho
962,965,318 P.3d 952, 955 (2014) (citing Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 129 Idaho 497,503,927
P.2d 887, 893 (1996); Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene Univ., 152 Idaho 660, 666-67, 273 P.3d
1253, 1259-60 (2012)).
In this case, plaintiffs requested an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rules 40, 41, and Idaho Code § 12-121. See Appellants' Brief: p. 20. However,
plaintiffs failed to present any argument as to why plaintiffs are entitled to the same. Since
plaintiffs failed to present any such argument, plaintiffs have failed to comply with Idaho
Appellate Rule 35.

Accordingly, defendants respectfully request the Court deny plaintiffs'

request for costs and fees on that basis.
Alternatively, defendants respectfully request this Court deny plaintiffs' request for fees
on substantive grounds.

The Idaho Supreme Court is permitted to award fees to a prevailing

party in "certain limited circumstances as authorized by I. C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kvamme,
155 Idaho 692, 316 P.3d 104 (2013) (citing Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Idaho Pub.

Utils. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401, 408, 871 P.2d 818, 825 (1994)).

"But attorney fees are not

awardable as a matter of right." Id. "They should only be awarded when the court believes 'that
the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."'

Id. "Attorney fees will not be awarded for arguments that are based on a good faith legal
argument." Id. (citing, e.g., Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,401,210 P.3d 75, 86 (2009)).
In this case, defendants respectfully submit plaintiffs should not be the prevailing party in
this matter because the trial court appropriately dismissed this case. Thus, plaintiffs should not
be entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and
should not be entitled to an award of costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
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However, even if plaintiffs prevail on any of their alleged claims of error, defendants
respectfully submit that defendants have not defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.

Defendants' arguments in defense of plaintiffs' alleged errors are all

supported by current precedent and the underlying record in this matter. They are ce1iainly
based on good faith arguments.

Therefore, defendants respectfully submit the Court deny

plaintiffs' request for fees on this basis as well.
V.
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARD ED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-121 AND IDAHO APPELLATE
RULES 40(A} AND 41

Defendants respectfully request this Court award defendants attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 41 and 40(a).
Idaho Code§ 1 121 permits an award ofreasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party.
LC. § 12-121. "To receive an LC. § 12-121 award of fees, the entire appeal must have been
pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641,
645,289 P.3d 43, 47 (2012) (Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741,756,274 P.3d 1256,
1271 (2012); Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 242, 254 P.3d 1231, 1238 (2011)) "Such
circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to second-guess the
trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly
applied well-established law." Id. (citing City of Boise v. Ada Cnty., 147 Idaho 794, 812, 215
P.3d 514,532 (2009).
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the trial court erred in applying well-established law on
the issues raised on appeal. Although plaintiffs rely upon recent appellate decisions, those cases
did not alter well-established law in the context of the gate keeping function of the trial court and
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decisions relating to the admissibility of expert witnesses' opinions in a medical malpractice
case.

Given this, defendants respectfully request the Court grant an award to defendants of

reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
Defendants also respectfully request costs as a prevailing party on this appeal pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request the rulings of the trial court in
this matter be affirmed, in all respects, and that the dismissal of this matter by the trial court be
upheld.
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